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█ Abstract In this essay I explore the account of imaginative phenomenology developed by Uriah Kriegel 
in The Varieties of Consciousness. On his view, the difference between perceptual phenomenology and im-
aginative phenomenology arises from the way that they present the existential status of their object: 
While perceptual experience presents its object as existent, imaginative experience presents its object as 
non-existent. While I agree with Kriegel that it’s likely that the difference between imaginative phenome-
nology and perceptual phenomenology is one not just of degree but of kind, I worry about the particular 
account that he has developed. I thus develop two lines of criticism. First, I question whether Kriegel is 
right that imagination presents its object as non-existent. Second, I question whether this account of im-
aginative phenomenology is consistent with other commonly-accepted facts about the nature of imagina-
tion. 
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█ Riassunto Fenomenologia dell’immaginazione e status esistenziale – In questo articolo intendo indagare 
l’approccio alla descrizione della fenomenologia dell’immaginazione sviluppata da Uriah Kriegel in The 
Varieties of Consciousness. Dal suo punto di vista, la differenza tra fenomenologia della percezione e feno-
menologia dell’immaginazione si mostra nel modo in cui queste presentano lo status esistenziale dei loro 
oggetti: se l’esperienza percettiva presenta il proprio oggetto come esistente, l’esperienza immaginativa lo 
presenta come non-esistente. Per un verso, concordo con Kriegel sulla probabilità che la differenza tra fe-
nomenologia dell’immaginazione e fenomenologia della percezione non sia di grado ma di genere, mentre, 
per altro verso, non sono convinta della correttezza del suo approccio. Pertanto vorrei sollevare due criti-
cità. In primo luogo, mi chiedo se Kriegel sia nel giusto quando ritiene che l’immaginazione presenti il 
proprio oggetto come non-esistente; in secondo luogo, mi chiedo se questa descrizione della fenomenolo-
gia dell’immaginazione sia coerente con altri fatti, comunemente accettati, circa la natura 
dell’immaginazione. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Immaginazione; Percezione; Fenomenologia; J.-P. Sartre; Valore epistemico; Emozione 
 

 
IN THE VARIETIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 
Uriah Kriegel undertakes the ambitious pro-
ject of cataloging our conscious experience. 
In particular, Kriegel is interested in deter-
mining how many distinctive types of phe-
nomenal primitives must be posited in order 
to account adequately for the stream of con-
scious experience.  
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By way of a discussion that is rich and 
thought-provoking throughout, Kriegel ar-
gues that there are six different types of phe-
nomenology, i.e., six distinct phenomenal 
primitives, each of which is basic, sui generis, 
and irreducible to any of the others. Three of 
these phenomenal primitives – perceptual phe-
nomenology, algedonic (pleasure/pain) phe-
nomenology, and imaginative phenomenology 
– are sensory in nature. The remaining three – 
cognitive phenomenology, conative phenome-
nology, and entertaining phenomenology – are 
non-sensory in nature. 
Since the existence of sensory phenome-
nology is relatively uncontroversial, and since 
there is general (if not universal) agreement 
that neither perceptual nor algedonic phe-
nomenology can be reduced to one another, 
Kriegel focuses his attention on non-sensory 
phenomenology. The three chapters at the 
heart of the book are devoted to establishing 
the existence and primitiveness of cognitive, 
conative, and entertaining phenomenology – 
and, in each case, to developing at least a pre-
liminary account of the relevant phenomenal 
character.  There are also two chapters (plus 
an appendix) aiming to rule out other possi-
ble candidates for phenomenal primitiveness.  
In particular, Kriegel explores moral phe-
nomenology, emotional phenomenology, and 
the phenomenology of freedom, and he ar-
gues that they are not on the same par as the 
six phenomenal primitives identified. Either 
they are reducible to a combination of these 
primitives (as he thinks is likely the case with 
emotional phenomenology and perhaps also 
the phenomenology of freedom), or they are 
a lower-level subcategory of one or more of 
these primitives (as he thinks is likely the 
case with moral phenomenology). 
Given the provocative nature of many of 
the claims just mentioned, it may come as 
something as a surprise that I will not take 
them up in my commentary on the book. Ra-
ther, I propose to focus on a very small part 
of the discussion – a short section that comes 
in the book’s concluding chapter. Having 
spent the bulk of the book on non-sensory 
phenomenology, Kriegel returns at the end to 
sensory phenomenology and, in particular, to 
the one type of sensory phenomenology where 
there is considerably less consensus about its 
status as a phenomenal primitive: imaginative 
phenomenology.  
Though the discussion comprises only 
about 10 pages, it is jam-packed with original 
and important theses about the nature of imag-
inative experience. Since I couldn’t in any case 
have done justice to a book of this breadth in a 
brief commentary, I hope I will be forgiven for 
focusing my discussion in this narrow way on a 
part of the book which is of particular interest 
to me personally.  And ultimately, though my 
focus will be narrow, I hope that closer atten-
tion to what Kriegel has to say about imagina-
tive phenomenology will also help to shed some 
light on his project as a whole. 
 
█  Kriegel’s view 
 
When discussing imaginative phenome-
nology, philosophers tend to proceed by situ-
ating it with respect to perceptual phenome-
nology, and here Kriegel is no different. His 
discussion is structured around three possible 
views we might take toward the relation be-
tween these two types of phenomenology. As 
we explore these three views and how they 
differ from one another, it might help to have 
an example before us, so take a moment and 
imagine a Steinway grand piano.  
Now take another moment and reflect 
upon your imaginative experience. In partic-
ular – assuming you’ve at some point had a 
perceptual experience of a Steinway grand 
piano – take a moment to compare your im-
agining to that perceptual experience. Pre-
sumably, your imaginative experience seems 
in some ways similar to it and in some ways 
different from it. How exactly we are to cap-
ture these similarities and differences is pre-
cisely what’s at stake in deciding among the 
three views that Kriegel discusses. 
According to what Kriegel calls the No Dif-
ference view (ND), there is no intrinsic differ-
ence with respect to phenomenology between 
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imagining and perceiving. Phenomenologically, 
imagining a piano and perceiving a piano are 
the same. Insofar as the experiences seem dif-
ferent to us, that difference is not present in the 
phenomenology itself but rather derives from 
our accompanying beliefs – our beliefs, say, 
about whether we are imagining a piano or see-
ing a piano, or about how well our experience 
coheres with other experiences.  
In contrast to ND, the other two views 
that Kriegel considers both posit a phenome-
nological difference between imagining and 
perceiving. According to what Kriegel calls 
the Difference in Degree view (DD), the dif-
ference is best understood as one of degree; 
according to what he calls the Difference in 
Kind view (KD), the difference is best under-
stood as one of kind. 
Drawing inspiration from Sartre’s views 
on imagination, Kriegel defends a version of 
KD. His case for KD, and against ND and 
DD, rests heavily on epistemological consid-
erations. In particular, Kriegel relies upon 
one key assumption: a subject undergoing a 
perceptual or imaginative experience  
 
can have a distinctively first-personal know-
ledge of what state she is in; not infallible or 
even otherwise privileged knowledge, but 
just distinctive knowledge.1  
 
When we add one further assumption 
about the content of perception and imagina-
tion – namely that imaginative experience and 
perceptual experience can share the exact same 
content – Kriegel thinks that we are naturally 
led to the kind of account that he offers.  
The argument, in (very) brief, runs as fol-
lows. A subject can typically know whether 
she’s in an imaginative or a perceptual state, 
and moreover, this knowledge typically has a 
certain epistemic character: A subject can 
achieve it immediately, effortlessly, and with 
a warranted feeling of certainty.2 If determin-
ing whether we’re perceiving or imagining 
required us to (say) compare our present ex-
perience to others and assess how well it co-
heres, then our knowledge would not have 
the epistemic character it does. So there must 
be some phenomenological difference to 
ground our knowledge and account for its 
epistemic character.  
But whatever this phenomenological dif-
ference, there seems to be no principled way 
to account adequately for it in terms of de-
gree.3 Nor can it be accounted for in terms of 
content. While it’s true that in many cases, 
and even in many cases involving the same ob-
ject, the content of perception and imagina-
tion will differ (e.g., my Steinway imagining 
might be less detailed than the analogous per-
ception), there are nonetheless other cases 
where there is no difference in content be-
tween perception and imagination. Yet even 
in these cases, there is still a phenomenal dif-
ference – what Kriegel calls a “deep differ-
ence” – between the two. Thus, there must be 
a difference in kind between imaginative phe-
nomenology and perceptual phenomenology. 
But what does this difference in kind 
amount to? In answer, Kriegel proposes that 
we look to the attitudinal nature of the expe-
riences in question.  
Perceptual experience and imaginative ex-
perience take different attitudes towards their 
objects, and in particular, these experiences 
present their objects differently with respect to 
what we might call their existential status (this 
is my term, not Kriegel’s). When you perceive a 
Steinway piano, your experience presents the 
piano to you as existing there before you in way 
that your imaginative experience of a Steinway 
piano does not. Perceptual experience presents 
its object as existent while imaginative experi-
ence presents its object as non-existent – and 
it’s this difference that, for Kriegel, grounds the 
phenomenological difference between these 
two types of experience.  
Kriegel doesn’t name his view, but for ease 
of exposition I’ll call it the existential status 
view. In the remainder of this comments, I’ll 
explore the plausibility of this view. 
 
█  Existential Status 
 
As Hume famously noted in his treatment 
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of imagination, nowhere than in imagination 
are we more free. Along similar lines, discus-
sions of imagination typically make note of 
its very wide range – we can as easily imagine 
three-headed purple dragons and canta-
loupes the size of the moon as we can imag-
ine Shetland ponies and ordinary-sized can-
taloupes. But of course, as this very point 
suggests, we can indeed imagine ponies and 
cantaloupes, that is, we can imagine mun-
dane existing things. And this fact seems to 
suggest an obvious objection to the existen-
tial status view.  
Given that I can imagine the cantaloupe 
that I bought at the store yesterday, a thing 
that I know exists, how can my imaginative 
experience of that cantaloupe differ from my 
perceptual experience of that cantaloupe 
with respect to the presentation of the canta-
loupe’s existential status? 
Aware of this objection, Kriegel is not 
very troubled by it. In answer, he suggests 
that even in cases where we imagine things 
that we know don’t exist, such things are 
nonetheless presented differently with re-
spect to their existential status than they are 
when we are perceiving them. So, for exam-
ple, even when I imagine Barack Obama, a 
man I know exists,  
 
it is plausible that my imaginative experi-
ence itself presents-as-nonexistent Obama; 
it is just accompanied by an overriding be-
lief that the imagined object in fact exists.4  
 
But here I think Kriegel’s answer may be a 
bit too quick. I have two reasons for concern, 
both of which are intended to undercut the 
suggestion that a presentation of non-
existence is built into the phenomenology of 
imagining. In particular, I’ll try to show that 
this suggestion runs counter to some other 
deep-seated intuitions that we have about 
imagination. 
First, compare imagining something that 
we know exists with imagining something 
that we know does not exist. Right now I’m 
imagining a Steinway grand piano – and in-
deed, I’m imagining a particular Steinway 
grand piano that I know to exist, the one 
that’s in the living room of my mother-in-
law’s house. Next, having imagined the 
Steinway, something I know to exist, I’ll im-
agine something I know not to exist. In par-
ticular, I’m now imagining a cat piano – a pi-
ano which, instead of strings, contains a 
number of cats who are arranged according 
to the pitch of their voices and whose tails 
are inserted into narrow openings; when the 
pianist hits a key, a sharp hammer descends 
on the corresponding cat tail.5  
If you did not engage in these two imagin-
ings along with me, then take a moment and 
engage in two of your own – first imagine 
something that you know to exist, then next 
imagine something you know not to exist, 
and then finally compare the two. In my own 
case, I find it plausible to say that there is a 
difference in the imaginative phenomenology 
with respect to the presentation of their exis-
tential status. While the cat piano is indeed 
presented-as-non-existent – while this seems 
built into the imaginative phenomenology – 
this does not seem true of my mother in law’s 
Steinway.   
As we’ve seen, Kriegel wants to account for 
the felt difference between the Steinway piano 
imagining and the cat piano imagining in 
terms of accompanying beliefs. On his view, 
both experiences have objects presented-as-
non-existent, but the first is accompanied by 
the overriding belief that the Steinway piano 
exists, while the second is accompanied by the 
overriding belief that the cat piano does not. 
In other words, Kriegel denies that there is a 
difference intrinsic to the phenomenology 
that can account for the difference in existen-
tial status between the two imaginings.  
Note that this puts him in a somewhat 
delicate dialectical position – while he insists 
that the difference in existential status be-
tween imagining and perceiving is intrinsic 
to the phenomenology, he also insists that 
the difference in existential status among dif-
ferent imaginings is not intrinsic to the phe-
nomenology. But aside from the delicacy of 
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his dialectical position, there is a deeper 
problem for his view. For if we suppose that 
there is no difference in the existential status 
of the two imaginings – if we suppose that 
the Steinway piano imagining presents it as 
non-existent in just the same way that the cat 
piano presents it as non-existent, that it pre-
sents the Steinway piano on an existential par 
with the cat piano – then the Steinway piano 
imagining would be importantly misleading.  
But while there may well be imaginings 
that are misleading in various ways, it does 
not seem that an imagining automatically be-
comes misleading solely in virtue of the fact 
that it is an imagining of something that ac-
tually exists. Thus, by building a presenta-
tion-as-non-existent into the phenomenology 
of imagination, Kriegel commits himself to a 
problematic picture of what we might call the 
epistemic value of imagining. 
Perhaps there is an adjustment that 
Kriegel could make to his view to accommo-
date this worry. For example, perhaps per-
ceptual objects are presented-as-before-the-
eyes (or before-the-senses) whereas imagina-
tive objects are presented-as-not-before-the-
eyes (or not-before-the-senses). Since neither 
the Steinway piano being imagined nor the 
cat piano is before the eyes, this suggestion 
might avoid the charge of misleadingness 
that I just raised. Granted, this sort of view 
runs into problems of its own, for even assum-
ing that it could be spelled out in a non-
question-begging way, a different kind of mis-
leadingness will arise when we imagine objects 
that are indeed right before us. But even if this 
charge can be avoided, or even if there is some 
other parallel suggestion in the general vicini-
ty, the second worry I want to raises poses a 
more general threat to views of this type.  
Consider a group of young children play-
ing a typical game of make-believe: They 
pretend they are being chased by a terrible 
monster. After a lot of running around, the 
game ends when the children successfully 
“trap” the monster in the basement, slam-
ming the door behind him. That night at 
bedtime, Heylin finds herself again imagin-
ing the monster down in the basement. She 
then imagines the monster escaping from the 
basement and finding its way upstairs. These 
imaginings terrify her, and she pulls the co-
vers over her head in fear. Heylin’s situation 
is not an unusual one. Children with active 
imaginations often scared by what they find 
themselves imagining.  
Indeed, this power of imagination is not 
limited to children, and it is not limited to 
fear. Just as our imaginings can scare us, they 
can also make us cry, make us laugh, make us 
squeamish, and so on. (Just think about our 
imaginative engagement with fiction). On 
Kriegel’s view, however, this power of imagi-
nation becomes especially difficult to under-
stand. If the monster is phenomenologically 
presented-as-non-existent, then it would 
seem that it would be considerably harder for 
the fear to take hold, or for it to take hold as 
intensely as it does.  
For a proponent of ND or DD, since the 
non-existence of the monster isn’t built into 
the phenomenology, the accompanying fear 
and its intensity are more easily explained. 
Such proponents likely see imaginings as ac-
companied by beliefs about the existence or 
non-existence of their objects, and there are all 
sorts of reasons that could be invoked to ex-
plain why in certain imaginative contexts the 
non-existence beliefs lack saliency. 
Importantly, my worry here should not be 
seen to collapse into the paradox of fiction. 
This paradox arises from what seem to be an 
inconsistent triad of plausible claims: (1) 
Someone can have a genuine and rational 
emotional response to an event only if she 
believes that the event has actually occurred; 
(2) We have genuine emotional responses to 
works of fiction; and (3) We do not generally 
believe that the events presented by the 
works of fiction have actually occurred. But 
however we answer the paradox of fiction – 
and this is going to be difficult for any theo-
rist of imagination – the proponent of a 
Kriegel-style KD faces a further problem: 
Once we build the presentation of existential 
status into the phenomenology of imagining, 
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i.e., once we claim that imaginative phenom-
enology by its nature presents its objects as 
non-existent, not only is it hard to see how 
our emotional responses to fiction could be 
both rational and genuine, but it is also hard 
to see how such emotional responses would 
even get generated in the first place. 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
The discussion of the previous section 
aimed to show two things. First, Kriegel’s view 
leaves us unable to explain the epistemic value 
of imagination. Rather, on his view, imagina-
tion becomes inherently misleading. Second, 
Kriegel’s view leaves us unable to explain imag-
ination’s power to produce emotional response. 
Rather, on his view, it remains something of a 
mystery how things that are phenomenologi-
cally presented-as-non-existent could produce 
strong emotional reactions in imaginers. 
While I think that these worries about 
Kriegel’s view deserve to be taken seriously, it’s 
also important not to exaggerate their scope. 
My discussion here does highlight the difficulty 
in assessing when exactly something belongs to 
the phenomenology of an experience, and 
when it can be attributed to accompanying be-
liefs – a difficulty that has more general ramify- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cations for Kriegel’s project as a whole. And I 
do take the worries to suggest that imaginative 
and perceptual phenomenology cannot be dif-
ferentiated from one another by means of their 
presentation of existential status. But nothing I 
have said here rules out there being some other 
means of differentiation, i.e., the truth of KD 
remains an open question. Indeed, given the 
elegance of Kriegel’s overall account of the va-
rieties of consciousness and the structural 
symmetry of his six proposed phenomenal 
primitives – something I haven’t been able to 
touch on in this brief commentary – this im-
pressive book offers us reason to believe that 
imaginative phenomenology is one such primi-
tive even absent a compelling account of its dis-
tinctive nature. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2015, p. 194. 
2 Ivi, p. 187. 
3 See ivi, pp. 189-191 for these arguments, which I 
regretfully can’t review here. 
4 Ivi, p. 192. 
5 For a fuller description of the cat piano, see The 
Museum of Imaginary Instruments at the following 
URL: <http://imaginaryinstruments.org/the-cat-
piano-katzenklavier-piano-de-chats/> 
